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THE VALUE OF A LIFE STORY AND WHY THE RIGHTS TO AN 
INDIVIDUAL’S LIFE STORY SHOULD NOT ESCAPE BANKRUPTCY   
Robert Sutton 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you turn on your television and you are immediately drawn into a 
police chase on the six o’clock news. The culprit veers onto an off ramp and 
disappears from the news helicopter’s cameras. The screen cuts away to the anchor, 
who—within minutes—has reports coming in that police have lost the suspect. Not 
only that, but the suspect is now believed to be the lead suspect in a string of 
murders over the past six months. Fast forward three years later and you are again 
watching television. The man who was driving that car is now on your screen 
sitting next to his attorney. You do not know him personally, but his face you will 
never forget; and you could probably tell someone more about this man, his job, his 
childhood, and all the hardships he has had to endure than you could about your 
own cousins. For the past ten months, the media has been engrossed with this man; 
his every move plastered across the news for all to see. As much as you want to see 
this man found guilty, your need to know more about him is even greater. The jury 
returns; his lawyers were superb. “Not guilty” on all four murder charges, but there 
are still the resisting arrest charges; he will do two years.  
Fast forward three years. You turn on VH1 and there he is again. He is being 
interviewed in front of a large oceanfront home. It is his home. Your head spins a 
little as you remember hearing he had declared bankruptcy just three months prior. 
As the fog in your head clears, you hear the interviewer speaking about a book 
deal. The man confirms he indeed has signed a tell-all deal. He turns slightly to 
look at the home behind him and smiles as he makes a joke about how sometimes, 
crime can pay. You turn the television off. Who could blame you? 
Scenarios like this are not uncommon. It has become a well-known fact that 
our society has an obsession with the morbid.1 Murder and mystery pique our 
intrigue. Through happenstance, there are times when individuals are faced with an 
opportunity to receive a windfall through great tragedy.2 Often is the case with 
 ________________________  
  J.D. Candidate 2015, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; B.S. Advertising, Rutgers 
School of Business - Camden, 2011. The author would like to thank his parents, family, and friends for their 
unconditional love and support in all his life endeavors. 
 1. See Keith F. Durkin, Death, Dying, and the Dead in Popular Culture, in 1 HANDBOOK OF DEATH & 
DYING 43, 43 (2003), available at http://www.sagepub.com/upm-
data/5234_Bryant__Death,_Dying,_Dead,_Popular_Culture.pdf. 
 2. See Josh Getlin, Despite Objections, ‘If I Did It’ Is Doing It, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2007), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/17/entertainment/et-ojbook17. 
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high-profile crimes, whether it be murder or an affiliation with the mafia.3 The 
litigation surrounding these crimes is often extensive and expensive.4 This was the 
case surrounding the Casey Anthony trial in Florida. Her litigation costs in 
attorney’s fees alone reached nearly $500,000.5 This debt, along with others, 
bringing the total to nearly $800,000, forced Casey Anthony to file for bankruptcy.6 
In an unprecedented move, the trustee requested that she be allowed to auction off 
her “life story rights” in order to help pay back her creditors.7 
This article will explore exactly which rights hold value and why the 
bankruptcy estate should be allowed to sell such rights. First, the article will cover 
the facts and some major events of the Casey Anthony case, including the 
attempted sale. Next, it will discuss the constitutional issues surrounding “life story 
rights,” as well as the general goals of bankruptcy. Finally, this article will discuss 
which rights are likely to be allowed to be sold and what type of infrastructure may 
work to guide such a sale. 
II.  THE CASEY ANTHONY CASE 
While the focus of this article revolves around Casey Anthony’s filing for 
bankruptcy and the assigned trustee’s subsequent request to sell Casey’s “life story 
rights,” it is important to start at the beginning. The sensitive nature of this case, 
which led to prolific media attention, is vital to understanding not only why a third 
party would be interested in purchasing Casey Anthony’s “life story rights,” but 
also in hypothesizing what a sale of such rights may look like in practice. 
On June 9, 2008, Casey Anthony claimed that her daughter, Caylee Anthony, 
was missing, but later informed police that she dropped Caylee off at her 
babysitter’s apartment.8 On July 15, 2008, Casey’s mother, Cindy Anthony, 
informed the police that she suspected Casey may have stolen the family car as 
well as money.9 Cindy also reported that she found Casey’s car, which had been 
previously abandoned.10 Cindy further reported that the car smelled of 
decomposition and when questioned by police, admitted that it has been over thirty 
days since she last saw her granddaughter.11 The following day, Casey Anthony 
was arrested by police on the suspicion of multiple charges, including child neglect 
and filing a false official statement.12 
 ________________________  
 3. See Ethan Bordman, How Much Does Crime Pay?, WASH. LAW., May 2011, http://www.dcbar.org/bar-
resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/may-2011-son-of-sam-laws.cfm. 
 4. See Jeff Weiner, Trustee Asks Judge to Allow Casey’s Story to Be Sold, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 18, 
2014), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-03-18/news/os-casey-anthony-sell-story-bankruptcy-
20130318_1_casey-anthony-movie-or-interview-jose-baez. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. CNN Library, Casey Anthony Trial Fast Facts, CNN (June 22, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/us/casey-anthony-trial-fast-facts/. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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On July 17, 2008, police found evidence of human decomposition as well as 
hair and dirt in Casey’s car.13 On August 27, 2008, air samples from the trunk of 
Casey’s car confirmed that a decomposing body had in fact been held inside.14 On 
October 14, 2008, Casey was indicted by a grand jury for capital murder.15 On 
December 11, 2008, skeletal remains were found in a wooded area near the 
Anthony home, and on December 19, the remains were confirmed to be Caylee 
Anthony.16 On May 24, 2011, Casey Anthony’s trial began.17 During the opening 
arguments, Casey’s attorney, Jose Baez, made allegations of child molestation 
against Casey’s father, George Anthony, and claimed that Caylee’s death occurred 
in the Anthony family pool, which Casey and George attempted to cover up.18 Jury 
deliberation began on July 4, 2011.19 After almost eleven hours, the jury returned 
with its verdict.20 Casey was found not guilty on charges of murder, child abuse, 
and manslaughter.21 However, she was found guilty on four separate charges of 
providing false information to law enforcement officers.22 Ultimately, on July 7, 
2011, Casey Anthony was sentenced to four years in prison, including time 
served.23 
The Casey Anthony tragedy was a saga that lasted well over four years, but 
Casey’s sentencing and subsequent release were not the end of the story. On 
January 25, 2013, Casey Anthony filed for bankruptcy, claiming nearly $800,000 
in debt, but less than $1,000 in assets, as well as being unemployed.24 On 
December 17, 2013, Casey was granted a standard bankruptcy discharge, 
eliminating most of her debt.25 However, it was what happened between these two 
events that is the most interesting. 
III.  THE ATTEMPTED SALE 
When Casey Anthony filed for bankruptcy, it was apparent that the bankruptcy 
trustee would not have much to work with.26 With a debt to asset ratio of nearly 
800:1, there simply would not be much for the trustee to distribute to Casey’s 
creditors.27 Then the trustee made an unprecedented move.28 The trustee petitioned 
 ________________________  
 13. Id. 
 14. CNN Library, supra note 8. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. CNN Library, supra note 8. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See CNN Library, supra note 8. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Elizabeth Chuck, Florida Judge Delays Decision on Selling Rights to Casey Anthony’s Life Story, 
NBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/09/17670492-florida-judge-delays-
decision-on-selling-rights-to-casey-anthonys-life-story?lite. 
3
Sutton: The Value of a Life Story and Why the Right to an Individual's Li
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2015
282 Barry Law Review Vol. 20, No. 2 
 
the bankruptcy judge overseeing the proceeding for permission to sell “the 
exclusive worldwide rights in perpetuity to the commercialization of Casey’s life 
story.”29 The motion that was filed indicated that there existed at least one written 
offer of $10,000 for the rights made by a Texas attorney, James Schober.30 
Interestingly enough, the offer was in no way contingent on Casey Anthony’s 
cooperation.31 In fact, Schober was not interested in profiting from the story which 
he sought.32 “[His] stated intention [was] to acquire the Property in order to prevent 
Ms. Anthony or others from publishing or profiting from her story in the future.”33 
When asked again about his intent, Schober responded, “[that he wanted] to 
demonstrate that the asset has present value; second, to ensure that the proceeds 
from the sale of the asset are applied to the payment of her existing debts . . . ; and 
third, to ensure that the sale of the asset takes place in the clear light of day.”34 
Casey’s attorneys claimed: 
“By allowing property that can only be created by post-petition 
labor to be sold as part of the bankruptcy estate, a debtor would 
never be able to achieve a ‘fresh start,’” the filing says. “Perhaps 
more troubling, the Order sought by the Trustee would result in the 
judicial invasion and taking of thoughts and memories that have 
not been memorialized but are contained solely within the debtor’s 
mind. This is a terrifying Orwellian prospect that would destroy 
the long-standing protections guaranteed by the Bankruptcy 
Code.” 
. . . .  
“The Trustee’s Motion would literally bar Ms. Anthony from 
ever discussi[ng] her life experiences with anyone by use of ‘all 
forms of social media’ or ‘the internet.’ Therefore, the plain 
language of the requested Order would bar Ms. Anthony from 
even sending an e-mail to her mother related to her childhood 
experiencing because the rights to those thoughts and memories 
would belong t[o] someone else . . . .”35 
At the close of the initial hearing the bankruptcy judge postponed judgment on the 
issue for thirty days.36 
 ________________________  
 29. Weiner, supra note 4. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Casey Anthony Offered 10,000 Dollars to Not Talk and Share her Story, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 16, 
2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2294532/Casey-Anthony-offered-10-000-dollars-NOT-talk-share-
story.html.  
 33. Weiner, supra note 4.  
 34. Chuck, supra note 28. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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A court ordered resolution never came.37 In May, the trustee withdrew the 
request, indicating that both parties were working on a settlement.38 Casey Anthony 
agreed to pay the bankruptcy estate $25,000 to forgo selling her “life story 
rights.”39 Given her financial situation, it was unclear where Casey Anthony would 
find the funds to pay the bankruptcy estate.40 Casey Anthony’s willingness to incur 
greater debt while involved in a bankruptcy proceeding raises many questions 
about the possible validity of such an endeavor. 
IV.  WHAT ARE “LIFE STORY RIGHTS?” 
What are “life story rights?” At first glance this seemingly innocuous question 
may appear straightforward and unambiguous, but as it turns out, that may not be 
the case. To the uninformed, the phrase “life story rights” may initially conjure an 
idea of a specific, well- defined, neatly-packed bundle of rights relating to the 
compilation and dissemination of the facts surrounding an individual’s life. 
However, the idea that “life story rights” exist in some tangible form that can be 
given, sold, or traded away is misleading. “What are referred to as ‘life story 
rights’ agreements are, in fact, more akin to covenants not to sue for invasion of 
privacy, slander, libel, etc. than they are a true grant of rights.”41 In this way, when 
one speaks of his own “life story rights” what he is actually referring to is not any 
specific set of facts or occurrences, but his ability to pursue legal action when the 
use of such facts or occurrences by a third party violates his rights.42 To better 
understand exactly what “life story rights” are, it is necessary to explore the genesis 
of these rights. 
The right to privacy is a logical starting point. It is difficult to find any specific 
language in our Constitution that grants an individual an all-encompassing right to 
privacy: the First Amendment’s43 protection of religion, speech, and assembly may 
be read to grant an individual privacy in his beliefs; the Third Amendment’s44 
prohibition against the forced quartering of militia in an individual’s home, as well 
as the Fourth Amendment’s45 protection against unreasonable search and seizure, 
allude to an individual’s right to privacy in his home, personal effects, and self; 
finally, the Fifth Amendment’s46 protection against self-incrimination grants an 
individual the right to keep certain information that could be considered 
incriminating private.47 It is clear that our Founding Fathers were well aware that a 
 ________________________  
 37. See Amy Pavuk, Casey Anthony to Pay $25K to Settle Life-Story Rights in Bankruptcy Case, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (July 8, 2013), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local/caylee-anthony/os-casey-anthony-life-story-
agreement-20130708,0,3635228.story. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. 5-23 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 23.07[A] (2014).  
 42. See id. 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  
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key component to an individual’s pursuit of happiness included privacy from 
governmental intrusion in many facets of life—an idea articulated by Justice 
Brandeis as: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the 
significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his 
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought 
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions 
and their sensations.48 
While the Founding Fathers foresaw the importance of privacy, it was not until 
much later that the idea that a cause of action should exist between private 
individuals for a breach of privacy came to light in the United States.49 Predating 
his opinion in Olmstead v. United States by nearly forty years, Brandeis, along with 
Samuel D. Warren, expressed concern that a private cause of action for a breach of 
privacy need exist in a law review article titled The Right to Privacy.50 The article 
explores the evolution of the law concerning real property, nuisance, slander, and 
libel, but ultimately recognizes that the existing framework has left a void, stating, 
“it required little consideration to discern that this . . . could not afford all the 
protection required, since it would not support the court in granting a remedy . . . 
.”51 Further explaining: 
We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected, 
whatever their exact nature, are not rights arising from contract or 
from special trust, but are rights as against the world [sic]; and, as 
above stated, the principle which has been applied to protect these 
rights is in reality not the principle of private property, unless that 
word be used in an extended and unusual sense. The principle 
which protects personal writings and any other productions of the 
  
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of 
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one . 
. . . The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers “in any 
house” in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. 
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the “right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Fifth 
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy 
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment 
provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.” 
Id.  
 48. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
 49. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 (1890). 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. 
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intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has 
no new principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the 
personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relation, 
domestic or otherwise.52 
This initial call for a cause of action resulting from a breach of privacy eventually 
led to its inclusion in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.53 Section 652A General 
Principle states: 
(1)  One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to 
liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. 
(2)  The right of privacy is invaded by 
(a)  unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated 
in § 652B; or 
(b)  appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 
652C; or 
(c)  unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as 
stated in § 652D; or 
(d)  publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light 
before the public, as stated in § 652E.54 
Today, many states recognize common law causes of action for breaches of privacy 
similar to what the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests.55 
Similar to, but not exactly mimicking the right to privacy, is the right to 
publicity.56 A New Jersey court explained: 
The right of publicity is a concept which has evolved from the 
common law of privacy and its tort “of the appropriation, for the 
defendant’s benefit or advantages, of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.” The term “right of publicity” has since come to signify 
the right of an individual, especially a public figure or a celebrity, 
to control the commercial value and exploitation of his name and 
picture or likeness and to prevent others from unfairly 
appropriating this value for their commercial benefit. The idea 
 ________________________  
 52. Id.  
 53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250 (Fla. 1944) (“[T]here is a right of privacy, distinct in and 
of itself and not merely incidental to some other recognized right, and for breach of which an action for damages 
will lie.”); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d 70, 82–83 (W. Va. 1983) (“[A] number of states whether by 
statute or by court decision, divided the tort of invasion of privacy into the following four categories: (1) 
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of another’s name or likeness; (3) 
unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places another in a false 
light before the public.”); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998) (“California courts have 
recognized . . . the privacy causes of action . . . : (1) public disclosure of private facts, and (2) intrusion into private 
places, conversations or other matters.”). 
 56. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981). 
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generally underlying an action for a right of privacy is that the 
individual has a right personal to him to be let alone and, thus, to 
prevent others from invading his privacy, injuring his feelings, or 
assaulting his peace of mind. In contrast, underlying the right of 
publicity concept is a desire to benefit from the commercial 
exploitation of one’s name and likeness.57 
The inclusion of a right to publicity is clearly a key component of an individual’s 
“life story rights.” After all, it is the commercialization of an individual’s person 
that leads to value.58 Without the right to publicity, there would exist little 
commercial benefit to “life story rights.” 
Less generic causes of action are also described in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts for defamatory statements, which include slander and libel.59 Section 558 
lists the elements for a defamation cause,60 while section 568 distinguishes slander 
and libel.61 It is important to note that for all three causes of action, certain 
conditions exist that may give rise to absolute or conditional immunity.62 For the 
purpose of this analysis, one such condition that will likely arise more often than 
not is the idea of “newsworthiness.”63 
V.  TWIN AIMS OF CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY 
At its heart, the bankruptcy process seeks to balance two competing goals: the 
equal distribution of funds to the debtor’s creditors, and the relief for the debtor 
from his financial past.64 Of interest for this analysis is the Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
or liquidation. The liquidation process is overseen by an appointed bankruptcy 
trustee who is in charge of selling the debtor’s non-exempt assets65 and distributing 
the net proceeds to the debtor’s creditors who hold allowed claims.66 In this way, 
the trustee is really the key component in ensuring that the first goal of a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy is met. The trustee is in charge of: policing the debtor, insofar as the 
trustee is responsible for reviewing claims for exempt assets; determining whether 
the debtor is attempting to file for bankruptcy in a manner that would be considered 
an abuse and therefore, not qualified for a discharge; determining whether or not a 
 ________________________  
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1997). 
 60. Id. § 558. 
 61. Id. § 568. 
 62. See id. § 558. 
 63. See Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377–78 (Fla. 1989) (“The right of privacy does 
not forbid the publication of information that is of public benefit, and the right does not exist as to persons and 
events in which the public has a rightful interest.”) (quoting Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715, 
717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)). 
 64. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1 (2d ed. 2009).  
 65. Id. at 92 (stating certain assets are exempt, and considered a major part of the debtor’s financial fresh 
start). 
 66. Id. 
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claim by a creditor is secured; and distributing funds for unsecured claims on an 
appropriate pro rata basis.67 
The second goal of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy focuses on relief for the debtor.68 
The immediate effects of filing a petition are momentous—the greatest of which is 
the automatic stay69 which stops all collection attempts by the debtor’s creditors 
with no other notice beyond the filing of the petition.70 While less important 
overall, but perhaps more important to the analysis at hand, is the creation of the 
bankruptcy estate.71 At the moment of filing, all legal and equitable interests in 
property held by the debtor become property of the estate.72 This is important to the 
analysis of selling “life story rights” because it is at this point that any assets 
subsequently acquired by the debtor are in fact, property of the debtor, not of the 
estate.73 Further analysis in subsequent sections will seek to clarify whether “life 
story rights” actually exist at the time of filing, absent an existing express 
agreement.74  
The second issue that presents itself in terms of the sale of “life story rights,” 
and possible conflicts that may arise when viewed against the backdrop of a fresh 
financial start, deals with the debtor’s future earning potential.75 “Postpetition 
proceeds are not included in the bankruptcy estate to the extent those proceeds are 
earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement 
of the case.”76 The fact that in order for the “life rights” to hold value, some form 
of postpetition action to create and disseminate facts pertaining to an individual’s 
life truly muddies the waters in terms of whether such a sale would unduly inhibit a 
debtor’s ability to earn an income postpetition. 
 ________________________  
 67. See id. at 87. 
 68. Id. at 1.  
 69. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2010). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2010). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See TABB, supra note 64, at 405.  
In five specific situations, postpetition property is added to the estate:  
1. The trustee recovers property for the benefit of the estate pursuant to the avoiding powers, 
or another enumerated Code section, § 541(a)(3);  
2. Property is preserved for the benefit of the estate or ordered transferred to the estate, § 
541(a)(4);  
3. The debtor gets a “windfall” by inheritance, divorce, or life insurance within 180 days 
after the filing, § 541(a)(5);  
4. The property is proceeds of estate property, § 541(a)(6); and 
5. The estate acquires property, § 541(a)(7).  
Id.  
 74. See infra Section VII. 
 75. See TABB, supra note 64, at 426. 
 76. Id.  
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VI.  SHOULD THE TRUSTEE HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO SELL CASEY’S LIFE 
STORY RIGHTS? 
When asked why he wanted to purchase the rights to Casey Anthony’s life 
story, Schober mentioned that he intended to show that the story held present 
value.77 In order for the asset to be included in the estate, it must have existed at the 
time the petition was filed and the estate was created.78 The baseline question 
becomes whether or not, at the time of filing, Casey Anthony’s life story had value 
as an asset. 
Based on events surrounding the murder, trial, and bankruptcy, it is likely that 
the rights to Casey Anthony’s life story did hold value.79 The most easily seen 
example is Schober’s offer itself, worth $10,000.80 In this case, the offer seems to 
be a self-justification, but it is not the only example that supports the proposition 
that Casey Anthony’s story holds value.81 The trustee claimed that there existed a 
second competing offer of $12,000.82 Even prior to the idea that Casey Anthony’s 
“life story rights” could be sold, Casey was receiving offers to sell her story.83 
After being released from prison in 2011, it was reported that an independent 
producer had offered Casey Anthony $1 million to tell her story.84 Davidson 
Goldin, a public relations expert,  said, “[b]etween a combination of a book, maybe 
some sort of magazine articles, TV interviews and other ways of telling this 
monstrous story that she has, she’ll probably be able to wrestle out of this about a 
million dollars,” on Good Morning America.85 Looking at similar situations, it is 
apparent that a book about a highly publicized case—with an outcome generally 
deemed unfavorable—could generate profit.86 O.J. Simpson was given a $1 million 
advance for his book, If I Did It, which described how Simpson could have 
committed the murders of those with which he was accused.87 While ultimately, 
none of the offers to the trustee amounted to a sale, and the O.J. case is not 
necessarily a direct analog, it is clear that people were willing to pay money to hear 
Casey Anthony’s story.88 Schober’s other reasons,89 revolving around the payment 
of creditors, as well as the transparency of the transaction, truly do speak to the 
fairness goals involved in any Chapter 7 bankruptcy.90 
Turning to Casey Anthony’s attorneys’ arguments, it is clear that they believed 
the proposed sale offended not only the bankruptcy goals, but also offended Casey 
 ________________________  
 77. Chuck, supra note 28. 
 78. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2014). 
 79. See Jim Avila, Casey Anthony: Will She Profit from Her Case?, ABC NEWS (July 17, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/casey-anthony-profit-case/story?id=14090596. 
 80. Weiner, supra note 4. 
 81. Chuck, supra note 28.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Avila, supra note 79. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Weiner, supra note 4. 
 89. Chuck, supra note 28. 
 90. Id. 
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Anthony’s constitutional rights.91 Based on the comments made by the attorneys, it 
would seem that the proposed sale of the “life story rights” was more of a gag order 
than anything else.92 They noted that Casey Anthony would be barred from sending 
e-mails or messages over social media websites based on the plain language of the 
motion.93 Clearly, such a chilling of Casey Anthony’s free speech by the court 
would have resulted in a constitutional violation.94 As the offer stood, it seemed as 
though Schober was overreaching in the covenants he sought.95 This was likely 
because what Schober actually wanted was to prevent Casey Anthony, or anyone, 
from profiting from the tragedy that had occurred.96 Such a restrictive offer was 
unlikely to have been approved had the bankruptcy judge been forced to make a 
ruling.97 This does not mean that Schober and the trustee’s idea to sell Casey 
Anthony’s “life story rights” was without merit.98 By analyzing the different facets 
of what “life story rights” include and how they interact with goals of bankruptcy 
and existing law, it may be possible to develop a model that allows all three to exist 
in harmony. 
VII.  A LOOK AT EACH PIECE OF THE “LIFE STORY RIGHTS” BUNDLE 
The discussion will again begin with an individual’s right to privacy. “[T]he 
tort of invasion of privacy [generally falls] into four categories: (1) unreasonable 
intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of another’s name or 
likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life; [or] (4) 
publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the public.”99 The 
acquisition of “life story rights” will generally include a clause or reservation 
preventing the individual from pursuing a cause of action for all four categories.100 
This type of clause will generally look similar to: 
[If Studio exercises the option . . . ] Owner hereby releases 
Studio from and agrees that Owner will not assert or maintain 
against Studio, its successors, assigns and/or licensees, any and all 
claims, actions, suits or demands, of any kind whatsoever, which at 
any time hereunder Owner may have or assert to have, arising out 
of or in connection with the Productions and/or the exercise of the 
Life Story Rights. This release and covenant not to sue is intended 
to include, but is not limited to, any claims, action, suits or 
 ________________________  
 91. See Amy Pavuk, Casey Anthony: Bankruptcy Attorneys to Argue over Rights to Sell Her Life Story, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 8, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-04-08/news/os-casey-anthony-
bankruptcy-life-story-20130408_1_casey-anthony-jose-baez-stephen-meininger. 
 92. See Chuck, supra note 28. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Pavuk, supra note 91. 
 95. See Chuck, supra note 28. 
 96. Weiner, supra note 4. 
 97. See Chuck, supra note 28. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d 70, 83 (W. Va. 1983). 
 100. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41. 
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demands, based upon any . . . invasion of privacy, defamation 
and/or right of publicity (whether statutory or otherwise).101 
This type of agreement is fairly common, and when undertaken under one’s own 
volition, it is unlikely that the legality of such an agreement would be 
questioned.102 However, the analysis is quite different when looked at from the 
perspective that it would be the bankruptcy estate signing away the rights of an 
individual and not an individual assigning his own rights.103 The question becomes: 
“Should we allow the bankruptcy estate to preclude an individual from seeking a 
cause of action he would normally be entitled to?” 
In my opinion, to allow the bankruptcy estate to preclude an individual from 
pursuing a cause of action for a violation of his right to privacy would be too far. In 
this case, there would be what essentially amounted to a violation of the 
constitutional rights previously discussed.104 We would have a state actor—the 
bankruptcy court—paving the way for a third party to violate the rights of an 
individual that our Constitution seeks to protect. This is by no means the end of the 
discussion. While it is likely that the trustee would not be allowed to assign an 
individual’s right to privacy, is it even necessary? 
While an individual who seeks to purchase a person’s “life story rights” may 
not be able to acquire a covenant precluding a right to privacy cause of action, 
there may in fact be little cause to do so. 
The right of privacy does not prohibit the publication of matter 
which is of legitimate public or general interest. At some point the 
public interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over 
the individual’s desire for privacy. It has been said that the truth 
may be spoken, written, or printed about all matters of a public 
nature, as well as matters of a private nature in which the public 
has a legitimate interest. However, the phrase “public or general 
interest,” in this connection does not mean mere curiosity. 
. . . One of the primary limitations upon the right of privacy is that 
this right does not prohibit the publication of matters of general or 
public interest, or the use of the name or picture of a person in 
connection with the publication of legitimate news. A person who, 
by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of life, or by adopting a 
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in 
his doings, his affairs and his character, may be said to have 
 ________________________  
 101. Id. 
 102. E.g., Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 103. See Weiner, supra note 4. 
 104. U.S. CONST. amend. I, III, IV, and V. 
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become a public personage, and he thereby relinquishes at least a 
part of his right of privacy.105 
It is clear from the above paragraphs that in the context of this discussion, there 
may actually be little value in an individual debtor’s right to privacy. After all, it is 
highly unlikely that, absent being a public personage, the debtor’s life story and 
surrounding facts would hold any commercial value.106 Also, it is unlikely that the 
facts a purchaser would be interested in would be completely irrelevant or 
unrelated to the events that generated the public interest or concern in the first 
place.107 Looking back at the Casey Anthony case as an example, the public 
interest was in the trial and the events that led to the trial.108 These types of facts 
are clearly matters of public interest.109  
So why then is the right to privacy so commonly included when speaking of 
“life story rights?” The answer is really very simple. A person producing a tangible 
version of another’s life story “[is] generally looking to minimize the risk of 
litigation and limit the effort [he] ha[s] to expend to obtain all underlying rights . . . 
.”110 It is important to remember that a lot of these ideas have their genesis outside 
of the bankruptcy context and are therefore, not necessarily tailored to meet the 
needs of the situations encountered in this sort of novel idea.111 While it is true that 
a bankruptcy trustee will likely not be allowed to assign an individual’s right to 
privacy, it would seem that is far from necessary.112 More important than the right 
to privacy, is the right to publicity.113 
The right to publicity is likely what a purchaser of “life story rights” is most 
interested in. It is what allows the purchaser to turn his investment into a profit.114 
Without it, there is not much else.115 It may seem at first that if the right to a 
privacy cause of action is precluded by public interest, then a person’s name or 
likeness should be allowed to be used in connection with a book or movie under 
the same rationale. This, however, is not the case. The difference has been 
explained as: 
[A]lthough the publication of biographical data of a wellknown 
figure does not per se constitute an invasion of privacy, the use of 
that same data for the purpose of capitalizing upon the name by 
 ________________________  
 105. Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 1944) (quoting 41 Am. Jur. 934, 937–38) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 106. See Avila, supra note 79. 
 107. See Tom Isler, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Obtaining a Subject’s Life-Story Rights, DOCUMENTARY 
MAG., Summer 2008, http://www.documentary.org/content/whose-story-it-anyway-obtaining-subjects-life-story-
rights. 
 108. See Avila, supra note 79. 
 109. See Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1378 (Fla. 1989). 
 110. Isler, supra note 107. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
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using it in connection with a commercial project other than the 
dissemination of news or articles or biographies does.116 
It is precisely the capitalization of one’s name that a would-be-purchaser of “life 
story rights” is interested in.117 It is clear that the right to publicity is far more 
relevant than the right to privacy, so again, it must be determined if a bankruptcy 
estate should be allowed to assign these rights. 
Unlike the right to privacy, the right to publicity is not as constitutionally 
grounded.118 A State’s interest in protecting an individual’s right to publicity deals 
more with encouragement.119 
[T]he State’s interest in permitting a “right of publicity” is in 
protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in 
part to encourage such entertainment. . . . [T]he State’s interest is 
closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, 
focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or 
reputation.120 
Clearly, the Court has chosen to avoid alluding to any constitutional guarantee as it 
has done in the past when discussing a right to privacy.121 While our Constitution 
may not present a major hurdle in terms of selling a debtor’s right to publicity, the 
goals of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy might.122 In fact, Casey Anthony’s attorneys’ 
objection to the sale of her “life story rights” was articulated as: 
By allowing property that can only be created by post-petition 
labor to be sold as part of the bankruptcy estate, a debtor would 
never be able to achieve a “fresh start,” . . . . Perhaps more 
troubling, the Order sought by the Trustee would result in the 
judicial invasion and taking of thoughts and memories that have 
not been memorialized but are contained solely within the debtor’s 
mind. This is a terrifying Orwellian prospect that would destroy 
the long-standing protections guaranteed by the Bankruptcy 
Code.123 
 ________________________  
 116. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967). 
 117. See Isler, supra note 107. 
 118. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.N.J. 1981). 
 119. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various 
guarantees create zones of privacy.”) (footnote omitted). 
 122. See Chuck, supra note 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123. Chuck, supra note 28. 
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The attorneys’ focus relies heavily on the idea of a financial fresh start, as well as 
the idea that, at the time of filing, there had yet to exist a tangible account of Casey 
Anthony’s life story.124 As previously discussed in this article, as well as being 
alluded to by Schober,125 it is likely that Casey Anthony’s “life story rights” held 
present value at the time that the bankruptcy estate was created, and therefore, 
should be viewed as an asset.126 What then becomes of the idea that an individual’s 
future earning potential should be unencumbered by his previous financial 
indiscretions? 
One view may be that because the “life story rights” hold present value they 
should be treated by the bankruptcy court the same as an existing executory 
contract or lease.127 The trustee has an option to first assume any such agreements 
and then assign those agreements to third parties for value, thus increasing the 
likelihood that a debtor’s creditors will be repaid that which they are owed.128 This 
idea is relatively straightforward and easy enough to understand. The issue here is 
that there is not necessarily an existing agreement, but only an asset that can be 
exploited for profit. Thus any agreement that the debtor becomes a party to, on his 
own volition or otherwise, may represent an encumbrance on his ability to earn a 
future wage. It is important however, to remember that the goals of a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy do not exist in a vacuum independent of each other, but rather they are 
competing claims which must be balanced against each other.129 A hybrid of 
existing theories may help to reach a realistic compromise. 
A sensible resolution would be to view the agreement in two distinct parts: a 
purchase price, and subsequent royalties with a time limiting reversion clause.130 In 
this case, the purchase price of the publicity rights would go to the estate in order 
to pay back a debtor’s creditors.131 The royalties, however, would be the rightful 
property of the debtor.132 This framework seeks to resolve the issues between both 
competing goals. On one hand, the value of the estate has been increased through 
the purchase price.133 This makes sense. The “life story rights” likely hold value, 
even absent a memorialization, thus, that value really should become part of the 
estate that the creditors are entitled to.134 However, without any payment going to 
the debtor, it may be said that this solution amounts to an unallowable prohibition 
of future income.135 
Herein lies the necessity for subsequent royalty payments to go to the debtor. 
This again makes sense. While the nebulous “life story rights” hold actual value, 
evidenced by the purchase price, the resulting sales of any tangible goods resulting 
 ________________________  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. 
 128. See TABB, supra note 64, at 863. 
 129. See id. at 1. 
 130. See 1-5 Entertainment Industry Contracts FORM 5-3. 
 131. See TABB, supra note 64, at 394. 
 132. See id. at 426–28. 
 133. See Chuck, supra note 28.  
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. 
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from such a purchase are merely speculative.136 This means that at the time of the 
creation of the bankruptcy estate, they do not represent a real or present value.137 
Any value derived therefrom would be postpetition and thus property of the 
debtor.138 
Further complicating the issue of royalty payments is the fact that the trustee 
would be acting in place of the debtor during negotiations. The easiest solution 
would be to create an objective standard. This standard could be something as 
simple as what would be considered the industry “norm.” Once it is established that 
the estate has a right to assign such rights, it is in the best interest for the debtor to 
cooperate. Thus, the onus would fall on the would-be-purchaser, as well as the 
debtor, to show what is just and reasonable. This is merely one solution to a 
problem that may not ever amount to a real issue. 
It is important to remember that both sides have an interest in obtaining what is 
best. As previously discussed, it is unlikely that a court would allow a debtor’s 
right to privacy to be contracted away by the estate (the same can be said for issues 
arising under defamation, which will be discussed later).139 In fact, it is even likely 
that a would-be-purchaser would not need these covenants, but he may still be 
interested in them.140 Again, there is an issue of goal balancing. What this really 
means is that the issue of royalty payments may actually be resolved 
collaboratively.141 Rather than preparing briefs or motions for the trustee to review, 
the two parties may find it more beneficial to work together when determining the 
fairness and adequacy of subsequent royalty payments.142 The debtor can offer the 
covenants that the estate will unlikely be allowed to offer.143 In return, the would-
be-purchaser may be more open to royalty payments slightly above that which are 
currently being offered.144 Both parties have an interest in limiting the amount of 
litigation surrounding the sale, in that time is essentially money. Further, a 
collaborative process would remove much of the ambiguity for both parties.145 In 
writing a book or motion picture script, the purchaser would have far less doubt 
about whether or not any future litigation would arise under a right to privacy or 
defamation claim.146 The debtor would be far more in control of how much the 
royalties are worth.147 This is all assuming that the purchaser chooses to exert his 
newly obtained rights of publicity. 
One may ask why anyone would purchase such rights and then choose not to 
exert them, but this scenario may in fact end up being far more common than one 
 ________________________  
 136. Id. 
 137. TABB, supra note 64, at 397–98.  
 138. See id. at 402, 426–28.  
 139. Chuck, supra note 28. 
 140. See Isler, supra note 107. 
 141. See TABB, supra note 64, at 427–28. 
 142. See id.  
 143. See Isler, supra note 107.  
 144. See TABB, supra note 64, at 427–28. 
 145. See Isler, supra note 107. 
 146. See id.  
 147. See TABB, supra note 64, at 427 (discussing the courts breakdown of royalty payments as postpetition 
proceeds). 
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would expect. In fact, Schober was seeking to do just that when he attempted to 
purchase the “life story rights” from Casey Anthony’s estate.148 For those 
individuals who become public figures not of their own volition, but by their 
notoriety connected to a heinous crime, there will be people who essentially seek to 
prevent them from profiting off of a tragedy.149 Perhaps a more likely scenario 
would be something as simple as fate. Issues may arise with securing funding for a 
production that prevents the purchaser from creating a tangible good that is 
exploitable for profit.150 This is where the necessity for a reversion clause comes 
in.151 Using the period of one year, we can see how this would work in practice. 
Assuming that the purchaser fails to produce, or to start production on, a 
marketable good related to the acquired rights within the period of year, such rights 
would revert back to the debtor.152 This prevents a purchaser from using the right to 
publicity as a gag order, as Schober was attempting to do.153 It is not difficult to see 
how a working model could be achieved through legislation and judicial opinion. 
The analysis on defamation causes of action is similar to that of the right to 
privacy. In his law review article, Brandeis explains defamation as “damage to 
reputation, with the injury done to the individual in his external relations to the 
community, by lowering him in the estimation of his fellows” and “in order to be 
actionable, have a direct tendency to injure him in his intercourse with others, and 
even if in writing or in print, must subject him to the hatred, ridicule, or contempt 
of his fellowmen . . . .”154 
When we look at the harm that such causes of action seek to prevent—
specifically, the damage to an individual’s reputation and subsequent difficulty he 
may have in conducting his affairs with others—it is plain to see that courts are 
unlikely to allow one individual to sign away these rights for another. To do so 
would be unilaterally unfair to the debtor.155 Unlike the right to publicity, there is 
no balancing of goals, only the one-sided loss for the debtor and therefore, no 
workable justification.156 In all reality, this ultimately plays out much in the same 
way as does the right to privacy. 
Just like with the right to privacy, covenants to refrain from bringing a 
defamation cause of action are unlikely to be allowed, but they are also likely to be 
of far less value than the right to publicity.157 Using the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts as an example, it is clear that in order to bring a cause of action for 
defamation one of the elements is “fault amounting at least to negligence on the 
part of the publisher.”158 
 ________________________  
 148. See CNN Library, supra note 8. 
 149. See Weiner, supra note 4.  
 150. See Isler, supra note 107.  
 151. See 1-5 Entertainment Industry Contracts FORM 5-3 (“A reversion can be used to provide for the 
return of rights if [production] does not commence within a specified period of time . . . .”). 
 152. See id. 
 153. See Weiner, supra note 2. 
 154. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 49, at 197.  
 155. See id.  
 156. See id. at 213.  
 157. See id. at 197. 
 158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) § 558. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In the end, it would seem as though the trustee for Casey Anthony’s 
bankruptcy estate may have been reaching. Schober’s offer, as was put forth in a 
motion to the court, was clearly far too restrictive to pass constitutional scrutiny.159 
While it may have been over-inclusive, it did introduce the idea that a story not yet 
memorialized can hold value.160 It also brought to light the type of social injustice 
that might occur when we allow a person to profit from his wrongs.161 The idea of 
selling “life rights” requires a complex blending of constitutional law, bankruptcy 
law, intellectual property law, as well as the wants and needs we hold closest as a 
society. 
The theory that a person’s “life story rights” should be able to be sold in 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings may be novel,162 but that does not mean that it is 
without merit. Until now, this article has focused on existing laws and how they 
may be adapted to help balance the fairness between the competing goals of the 
debtor and creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. In closing, I believe that it is also 
important to ask ourselves if we want to live in a society that would allow those 
individuals who are responsible for, or involved in, tragedies so atrocious that they 
mesmerize a nation, to subsequently profit from these tragedies, all the while 
shirking financial responsibilities that they incurred to protect themselves from the 
consequences of their actions. I know I do not. 
 
 ________________________  
 159. See Chuck, supra note 28. 
 160. See id.    
 161. See Bordman, supra note 3. 
 162. Mike Schneider, Casey Anthony Will Pay $25,000 Not to Sell Her Life Story, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 
1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/casey-anthony-life-story_n_3689734.html. 
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